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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Ten years of economic transition in post-socialist countries proved that
institutional aspects of economic policy formation are at least as impor-
tant for the success of reforms as their purely "economic" aspects. The
importance of political economy factors in trade reforms is widely recog-
nized in the theoretical literature. One can identify two important dimen-
sions of the trade liberalization problem that should be addressed in the
political economy setting.
First, to predict the pace of liberalization, one should know what are the
exact political economy mechanisms governing trade policy formation in
a given system of policy making institutions. Second, to analyze the
impact of trade liberalization on the national economy, it is necessary
to assess the level of distortions associated with "pre-reform" trade
policies.
Though these two dimensions of the problem are obviously related to
each other, in most cases they are addressed independently. Studies
of the impact of trade liberalization on trade flows and aggregate welfare
have been flourishing in recent decades, but even the most sophisti-
cated studies do not usually take into account the role of political econ-
omy mechanisms underlying trade policy formation. Meanwhile, recent
studies showed that endogenizing trade policy variables can significantly
change the estimates of the impact of trade barriers on the volume
of trade.
In turn, most empirical studies on endogenous trade protection assume
that import penetration is an important explanatory variable for the exist-
ing level of trade barriers, while the relationship in the opposite direction,
though sometimes recognized, is not explicitly taken into account. Such
an approach seems to be quite justified when the time period under
consideration is short enough so that a newly established protection level
does not influence import penetration; for longer time periods, however,
results may be seriously biased. As a consequence, simultaneous esti-
mation of models describing the political economy mechanism of trade
policy formation and the impact of import barriers on trade flows can
provide us with a better understanding of both the roots and fruits of im-
port protection.
This paper addresses the political economy background of import pro-
tection policy in Russia under the system of policy making institutions
developed during the period 1992 – 1997. It approaches to
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• identify the set of political economy factors affecting government de-
cisions on the structure of import tariff rates,
• estimate the impact of tariffs on Russian trade when their political
economy determinants are explicitly taken into account, and
• provide insights into possible ways of further trade liberalization given
the existing system of policy making institutions.
To reach these goals, a theoretical framework for analyzing the structure
of both import flows and tariff rates is elaborated. This framework is then
used to construct, for the purpose of the empirical investigation, the En-
dogenous Protection models and the Import Penetration models. The
Endogenous Protection models are designed to test assumptions about
the impact of pressure groups on tariff policy as well as the desire of
government officials to use import tariffs to support stagnant industries
and mobilize additional budget revenues. It turn, the Import Penetration
models addresses the impact of factor intensity variables and economies
of scale (as proxied by quality differences between domestic and im-
ported goods) on alternative measures of the market share of imports.
The Import Penetration models and the Endogenous Protection models
are estimated both independently and in a simultaneous setting. The
most important findings can be summarized as follows:
• The level of import penetration seems to be unaffected by tariff rates.
No statistically significant negative influence of tariff rates (whether
actual or predicted from the Endogenous Protection models) on the
level of import penetration were discovered. This "neutrality" of tariff
rates does not mean, however, that the effects of protection are en-
tirely harmless, as import tariffs in any case exercise upward pressure
on domestic prices and thus redistribute income from consumers to
producers.
• There are convincing signs of a counterintuitive relationship between
the factor cost shares and the measures of import penetration. The
finding that Russian imports appear to be labor intensive rather than
capital intensive contradicts the stylized beliefs about the structure of
comparative advantages in Russian foreign trade. Thus, further study
is needed to identify the determinants of the Russian import structure
in line with the recent efforts to explain the apparent contradictions
between trade patterns in the real world and the predictions of the
Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem.
• Import penetration determined by factor intensity variables appears to
be the most important determinant of tariff rates. In contrast with the
more traditional endogenous protection models that use actual values
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of import penetration, models with the predicted import penetration
variables allow one to explain a substantially higher share of variation
in tariff rates. The impact of the predicted import penetration vari-
ables is highly stable with respect to the set of industry observations
as well as other variables in the Endogenous Protection model. We
can thus conclude that the institutional system of tariff policy forma-
tion in Russia favors the protection of industries whose low competi-
tiveness in foreign trade is caused by the comparative advantage
factors.
• No single hypothesis could be interpreted as an unambiguous expla-
nation of the tariff formation process. There is evidence pointing to
(1) the influence of pressure groups on the policy decisions, and the
desire of policy makers to (2) provide at least moderate support for
stagnant industries as well as (3) maximize tariff revenues.
These results can form the basis for assessing the prospects of further
import liberalization in lines with the WTO rules. Given the finding about
the "neutrality" of tariff rates, their reduction will hardly affect import
penetration substantially. As a consequence, pressure group opposition
against lowering tariff rates is unlikely to be harsh.
The "neutrality" of tariff rates also suggests that the decrease in gov-
ernment revenues due to lower tariff rates will not be compensated for,
as import volumes will not rise substantially. Adequate compensation for
the revenues lost can be achieved by closing channels for "grey" im-
ports. These measures will not only generate additional revenues for the
budget but also raise the support of import-competing producers who
would be more eager to accept the "bundle" of government policies
which supposes lower tariffs but higher barriers for illegal imports.
Finally, there is a need for reconsidering the role of tariffs in protecting
stagnant industries. Given the large variance in enterprise performance,
tariffs are quite imprecise instruments of industrial policy as they "pro-
tect" enterprises irrespective of their ability to adjust to the prevalent de-
gree of import competition. Microeconomic policies of industrial re-
structuring seem to be more appropriate than tariffs for raising the
degree of competitiveness, at the same time allowing the government to
generate additional tax revenues due to the rise in enterprise efficiency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Trade policy reforms in transition economies during the 1980s and 1990s
brought about some puzzling results that went contrary to widely held
expectations. On the one hand, many countries were able to pursue lib-
eral trade policies despite the alleged influence of powerful pressure
groups interested in import protection. On the other hand, in some
countries radical dismantling of trade barriers resulted in only marginal
changes in resource allocation and overall economic efficiency. These
puzzles have attracted considerable attention of trade analysts (see,
e.g., Harrison and Hanson (1999) and the literature cited thereof) and
induced them to appeal to the political economy approach to trade
regulation for possible explanations (for an overview of this approach,
see Mayer, 1984; Magee et al., 1989; Rodrik, 1995).
The importance of political economy factors in trade reforms is widely
recognized in the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1989; Hillman
and Ursprung, 1996; Wunner, 1998). We can identify two important di-
mensions of the trade liberalization problem that should be addressed in
the political economy setting.
First, to predict the pace of liberalization one should know what are the
exact political economy mechanisms governing trade policy formation in
a given system of policy making institutions. For this purpose, one needs
to answer the following questions: How does the government react to
pressures exercised by protectionist lobbies? What weight does it assign
to the welfare of ordinary citizens or distinct social groups? Does it pur-
sue some "autonomous" motives in trade policy (i.e., motives not related
to the strategy of maximizing political support)?
Second, to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on the national
economy, it is necessary to assess the level of distortions associated
with "pre-reform" trade policies. Reduction in trade barriers may (or may
not) lead to intensive shifts in the degree of import penetration in differ-
ent industries depending on the historical structure of trade protection
(Harrison and Hanson, 1999).
Though these two dimensions of the problem are obviously related to
each other, in most cases they are addressed independently. Studies on
the impact of trade liberalization on export-import flows and aggregate
welfare have been flourishing in recent decades, but even the most so-
phisticated of these studies usually do not take into account the role of
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political economy mechanisms underlying trade policy formation (see,
e.g., the prominent studies of the Uruguay Round results such as those
by Francois et al., 1995; Hertel et al., 1995; Harrison et al., 1997).
Meanwhile, endogenizing trade policy variables can significantly change
the estimates of the impact of trade barriers on the volume of trade. For
example, empirical analysis shows that the impact of non-tariff import
barriers in the model with endogenous protection is some 10 times as
high as it is in the models that treat protection levels as an exogenous
variable (Trefler, 1993).
In turn, most empirical studies on endogenous trade protection assume
that import penetration is an important explanatory variable for the exist-
ing level of trade barriers, while the relationship in the opposite direction,
though sometimes recognized, is not explicitly taken into account (for
one of the recent examples, see Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998). Such an
approach seems to be quite justified when the time period under consid-
eration is short enough so that a newly established protection level does
not influence import penetration; for longer time periods, however, re-
sults may be seriously biased.
As can be seen from what has been said above, simultaneous estimation
of models describing political economy mechanisms of trade policy for-
mation and the impact of import barriers on trade flows can enable us to
receive more realistic answers to two major questions:
• What are the particular political economy forces governing the evolu-
tion of trade policy in a transition economy given the existing system
of policy-making institutions? In other words, what are the political
economy roots of import protection?
• What is the "true" impact of trade barriers on import flows, given that
the endogenous character of trade policy is fully recognized? That is,
are the fruits of import protection as dangerous for the economy as is
usually suggested?
This paper addresses these questions through the econometric analysis
of data related to the Russian experience with trade policy reform. The
material is organized as follows. In Section 2, the nature of the problem
under consideration is explained. Section 3 contains the description of
the theoretical basis on which the empirical models in Section 4 are con-
structed. The results of testing these models are presented in Section 5.
Finally, in Section 6, the major findings of the study and its principal pol-
icy implications are summarized.
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2. THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY
The purpose of the paper is to explain the political economy background
of the import protection policy in Russia and to assess its impact on im-
port flows. These questions are approached by comparing the results of
testing models that treat endogenous tariff policy formation and the im-
pact of tariff rates on import flows as independent processes and mod-
els that treat these processes as simultaneous ones.
The analysis of endogenous tariff protection rests principally on the re-
sults of our previous work.1 In that study, political economy mechanisms
governing tariff formation were examined in a year-by-year setting (for
the period 1993 – 1997) for the commodity types classified by the offi-
cial statistics as "the main commodities of Russian foreign trade". This
mechanism can be described by the "stagnant industries – tariff reve-
nues" hypothesis that stresses the government's desire to support in-
dustries suffering from an adverse economic situation as well as to raise
additional revenues for the budget.2
In the previous study, import penetration levels in each individual year
were assumed to influence the tariff formation process during the year
under consideration, being independent of the impact of tariff rates es-
tablished by this process. Though such an assumption is quite reason-
able during a period of frequent and profound tariff changes, it is of
course not realistic as far as the period as a whole is concerned. To ad-
dress the problem of endogenous tariff formation in a more general way,
we should take into account the two-directional interaction between tariff
rates and the degree of import penetration.
The simultaneous models for analyzing this interaction are constructed
using the theoretical framework proposed by Trefler (1993). Our distinc-
tions from Trefler's model are the following: (1) trade policy variables in
the focus of this paper are tariff rates, not non-tariff barriers; (2) we are
interested not only in assessing the impact of trade barriers on import
flows, but also in identifying the particular political economy forces be-
hind these barriers; (3) Trefler analyzed the impact of trade barriers on
import flows in a comparative advantage setting; in addition, we take into
account economies of scale, a factor stressed by the New Trade Theory
(e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
                                               
1 See Afontsev (2000). The earlier version of this article was presented at the first
annual Global Development Network conference in Bonn, December 6 – 8, 1999.
2 Some of our results — e.g., those related to the impact of the import penetration
variable as well as the share of industrial sectors in total employment — also gain
support from the model for 1993 presented by Neven et al. (1998).
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In this empirical study, the attention is focused on the year 1997 for
the following reasons: (1) the process of tariff structure formation, which
was launched in 1992 from the level of zero tariff protection, was gener-
ally completed by this year; (2) the structure of the comparative advan-
tage that was reported to change intensively during the first years
of economic transformation in post-communist countries (Neven, 1994)
had probably more or less stabilized; (3) the crisis of 1998 produced
short-term disturbances that made foreign trade data for the later period
less appropriate for the analysis of longer term phenomena of tariff pol-
icy formation.
To explore the problems of interest, three types of models described in
Section 4 are estimated. Before this, however, it is necessary to clarify
the theoretical background for constructing empirically verifiable hy-
potheses.
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
This section presents a general structure of economic models based on
the endogenous protection theory to reflect the logic of the tariff forma-
tion process. The material is organized as follows. The point of departure
is the behavior of firms engaged in lobbying for higher tariff rates. Then
follows the analysis of the utility function maximized by the government
with some implications for the empirical exercise. Finally, attention is
given to the determinants of the import penetration levels that play a
prominent part in the analysis.
3.1. Lobbying
Each firm i in an industry producing a tradable good g maximizes its
benefit function
Bi = Si(t) – ci, (1.1)
where Si(t) is a supplier surplus function for firm i, t is the tariff rate (tar-
iffs being the only policy instruments used by the government), and ci is
the sum of money used for lobbying. We assume here that these lobby-
ing expenditures take the form of a welfare transfer (in terms of cam-
paign contributions, bribes, etc.) from the lobbying firm to the govern-
ment that formulates tariff policy. An individual firm thus maximizes Bi by
choosing ci such that the marginal benefits from the increased protec-
tion will equal the marginal costs of extra lobbying.
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Let Si(t) = uiS(t), where S(t) is a supplier surplus for an industry as a
whole and ui is the share of firm i's sales in total sales of an industry.
The total sum of lobbying expenditures of all firms in an industry (C) is
an important factor (though, as can be seen in the next section, not the
only factor) affecting the level of tariff rate t, with dt/dC ≥ 0. The first or-
der condition for maximization of the benefit function is given by
dBi/dci = ui(dS/dt)(dt/dC)(dC/dci) – 1 = 0, (1.2)
where dS/dt ≥ 0, dt/dC ≥ 0, dC/dci ≥ 0.
Consider the behavior of dC/dci. Using the standard assumption that
tariff protection represents a public good for members of the pressure
group, we have the following form of the total lobbying expenditure
function:
C = C′ + ci,        where C′=Σj, j≠i cj. (1.3)
An increase in ci raises C directly, while at the same time it generates
the stimuli to free ride for other firms in the industry, i.e., to decrease
their own lobbying contributions:
dC′/dci ≤ 0.
As a consequence, we have
0 ≤ dC/dci ≤ 1,
with
dC/dci = 1
if there is only one firm in the industry and
dC/dci → 0
if the number of firms in the industry (n) approaches infinity.3 Thus, we
can state that
dC/dci = ϑ(n), 0 ≤ ϑ(n) ≤ 1, dϑ(n)/dn < 0. (1.4)
Let us turn now to the behavior of dS/dt. The absolute supplier surplus
gain from a given rise in t is higher the higher the volume of sales V and
the higher the responsiveness of the domestic supply function to the rise
                                               
3 The proposition that a higher number of firms is associated with a lower value of
dC/dci corresponds to the classical assumption by Olson (1965) that the degree
of the free rider problem is positively associated with the number of lobby mem-
bers.
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in a commodity price (p) caused by the rise in tariffs, since the increase
in the volume of national production Q allows national firms to capture
some share of the domestic market formerly supplied by imports. As
dQ/dp > 0, d2Q/dp2 < 0 (given the decreasing returns on the industry
level) and dD/dp < 0 (where D = Q+M is the level of domestic demand
for good g, whereas M is the volume of imports), then for given demand
and supply curves, higher values of dQ/dp are associated with a higher
import penetration ratio defined as m = M/Q. Thus, we can write
dQ/dp = Y(m), dY(m)/dm > 0 so as the expression for the supplier sur-
plus gain would be
dS/dt = Θ(V, Y(m)).4 (1.5)
Given the standard assumption of decreasing returns to lobbying
(d2Bi/dci2 < 0), every factor raising dBi/dci for each ci raises the equilib-
rium level of a firm's expenditures for lobbying eic . Let
Ψi(V, n, m, ui) = eic , 
e
ic  ≥ 0. (1.6)
From arguments stated above, we have the following properties of Ψi:
→ ∂Ψi/∂n < 0 from (1.4); (1.7)
→ ∂Ψi/∂V > 0, ∂Ψi/∂m > 0 from (1.5); (1.8)
→ ∂Ψi/∂ui > 0 directly from (1.2). (1.9)
Assume also ∂2Ψi/∂ 2iu  > 0; that is, for low levels of ui a given increase in
the market share leads to a small increase in dBi/dci due to the dissipa-
tion of benefits from an increase in tariff rate t to other firms in the in-
dustry. On the contrary, firms controlling large market shares can expect
to capture most of the benefits generated by their lobbying activity.
The equilibrium level of total lobbying expenditures in industry Ce is de-
fined by the function
Ψ = ΣiΨi(V, n, m, ui). (1.10)
                                               
4 Note that for the increasing-returns-to-scale industries, we can just write
dS/dt = Θ(V), as for the given shapes of the demand and supply curves a higher
volume of sales also means greater responsiveness of the production volume to
price increases (dQ/dp).
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Then,
→ ∂Ψ/∂n < 0, ∂Ψ/∂V > 0, ∂Ψ/∂m > 0, (1.11)
since (1.7) and (1.8) hold for each Ψi;
→ for given V, m, n, and uk = uk+1, ∂2Ψi/∂ui2 > 0 implies
Σi, i≠k, k+1Ψi(V, n, m, ui) + Ψk(V, n, m, uk) + Ψk+1 (V, n, m, uk+1) <
< Σi, i≠k, k+1Ψi(V, n, m, ui) + Ψk(V, n, m, uk + d) +
+ Ψk+1 (V, n, m, uk+1– d). (1.12)
It follows from (1.12) that having two industries that are otherwise simi-
lar, we could expect that the more highly concentrated one would be
able to generate a higher transfer of resources for the government.
Arguments presented in this section form the basis of the pressure
group hypothesis that is usually appealed to as the major explanation of
the tariff formation process. Now we should analyze the behavior of the
government that reacts to lobbying contributions and also takes into ac-
count some additional considerations.
3.2. The Government
To approximate the Russian situation more precisely, we concentrate our
attention here on the behavior of the government as the only supplier of
trade policies and follow the general logic of the political contributions
approach to trade policy formation.5
The government sets tariff rates for each tradable good g so as to
choose internal price vector P = P(p1, p2, ..., ph) that maximizes the po-
litical support function
G = aΣgCg(tg) + W(P), (2.1)
where Cg(tg) is the amount of lobbying expenditures from an industry g
that can be collected if tg is enacted, W(P) is the total welfare of the
                                               
5 For the typology of approaches to endogenous protection modeling, see Rodrik
(1995). The classical example of the approach under consideration is of course
Protection for Sale by G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). The recent paper is
not designed to test the implications of the Grossman – Helpman model (for two
of the most recent tests, see Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Goldberg and
Maggi, 1999). Rather, the general framework of the political contributions ap-
proach is used to construct a set of analytical cases (in some sense, "ideal types"
of tariff policy formation) to put forward empirically testable propositions.
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country's citizens that stays in this formula for the interest of the voters,
and a > 0 is the relative weight attached by the government to lobbying
contributions as compared with aggregate welfare.6 Note that Cg(tg) in
our formulation is independent of internal price vector P if all g's are final
goods since the number of people responsible for making decisions on
the level of lobbying expenditures is too small as compared with the total
population, and they consume only a negligible proportion of the total
amount of each good g; thus, they care only about the price of the good
that is produced by their respective industries.
The aggregate welfare function is the aggregate of individual welfare
functions Wj(P) that in turn depend on the level of money income, Ij(P);
government transfers, rj; and consumer surplus, wj(P):
W(P) = ΣjWj(P) = Σj(Ij(P) + rj + wj(P)). (2.2)
The total amount of government transfers depends on the total level of
tariff revenues R(P) that is assumed here to be the only source of money
available for redistribution, while the "ordinary" expenditures are finan-
ced out of non-tariff revenues:
Σjrj = R(P) = Σg∆pg(Dg – Qg), (2.3)
where ∆pg is the price increase for good g due to tariff tg, while Dg and
Qg are levels of domestic demand for and domestic supply of this good.
We assume that in the general case, government transfers rj do not de-
pend on lobbying contributions studied thus far. Indeed, efforts of differ-
ent groups to obtain a larger share of these revenues could be de-
scribed as a game at the second level of rent seeking (Buchanan, 1980),
which is not the subject of our concern here.
The logic presented here allows us to explore different types of govern-
ment behavior.
Case 1. Assume first that the government is entirely captured by pres-
sure groups so that it does not care about the welfare of "ordinary" citi-
zens (this description suits both the situation of a "weak government" as
usually understood and the situation of a strong dictatorship serving the
interests of definite economic groups). Then, decisions to impose higher
tariff rates depend on (1) the intensity of lobbying by those pressure
groups that are able to overcome the free-rider problem, and (2) the
ability to collect tariff revenues to be distributed among these groups.
                                               
6 It is quite reasonable to assume that a is the same for all industries; i.e., the
government does not differentiate between contributions received from various
pressure groups.
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Case 2. In Section 3.1, we assumed that the only trade policy variable
which firms in each industry try to influence is the tariff rate for a good g
produced by this industry. If some g's are intermediate goods, it is pos-
sible that some industries will lobby not only for a tariff on their own
good but also against tariffs on goods used in their production process.
In this case, due to counter lobbying, tariffs for intermediate goods will
be as a rule lower than those for final goods; this is indeed a common
political economy explanation of the tariff escalation phenomenon.
Case 3. Assume now that the government maximizes the "conservative
social welfare function" as suggested by Corden (1974): it alleviates
losses of producers operating in industries with high and/or rising
import penetration (or suffering from output decline induced by foreign
competition) by levying tariffs on their goods. At the same time, it com-
pensates the welfare losses of those hurt by tariffs through transfers out
of tariff revenues, and assigns zero weight to lobbying contributions
(a = 0 in (2.1)).7 The more workers employed in an industry, the more
evident becomes the "conservative social welfare" reason to support
them with tariffs. This also implies that higher tariffs could be applied to
goods produced by just those industries that in Cases 1 and 2 would be
unable to overcome the free rider problem due to the large number of
enterprises. The logic is straightforward, as industries with a large num-
ber of enterprises tend to be geographically dispersed and employ more
voters.8
Case 4. Finally, consider the revenue-constrained government whose
non-tariff revenues are insufficient to finance its "ordinary" expendi-
tures. In this case, the government is forced to maximize tariff reve-
                                               
7 This implies zero efficiency of lobbying and thus the absence of pressure group
activity. Note that as there is no lobbying in this case, the government should take
into account the observed import penetration, whereas in the lobbying cases, the
government reacts to the degree of import penetration as revealed by the pres-
sure groups' demands (e.g., when pressure groups confront the government with
their contribution schedules as assumed by Grossman and Helpman, 1994). This
fact presents a sort of problem for empirical research: indeed, import penetration
variables known to pressure groups, on the one hand, and the government, on
the other, could differ substantially. This problem will be discussed in more detail
in Section 4.1.
8 The maximization of the conservative social welfare function does not necessar-
ily assume benevolent government behavior. The principal attention given to the
voters' welfare could be accounted for by the desire of the incumbent govern-
ment to raise electoral support when the (positive) elasticity of votes on the level
of lobbying contributions is low. In this respect, arguments presented in the text
are equivalent to the "adding machine hypothesis" suggested by Caves (1976).
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nues — Σg∆pg(Dg – Qg) — while at the same time it tries to minimize
distortions introduced by tariffs to the aggregate welfare function where
transfers rj go down to zero due to the absence of "free funds".
The four cases described above represent analytical "ideal types" that
can hardly be found in the real world in their pure form. However, it is
useful to formulate explicitly the key factors explaining the tariff structure
in these "ideal" cases to see what are the major novelties introduced by
taking into account the behavior of the government (Table 1). As can be
seen, the set of factors that could affect the level of tariff rates is quite
large. In Section 4, the information on these factors is used to formulate
empirically testable propositions about the determinants of the Russian
tariff structure.
Table 1. Key Factors Explaining the Tariff Structure when the Government's Be-
havior is Explicitly Modeled
Case Description Key explanatory factors
Case 1 "Captured" government Lobbying contributions to raise
tariffs; tariff revenues
Case 2 Lobbying with intermediate
goods
Lobbying contributions
to raise/reduce tariffs
(tariff escalation pattern)
Case 3 "Conservative social welfare
function"
Degree of import competition
observed by the government;
number of employees
Case 4 Revenue-constrained
government
Tariff revenues
3.3. The Import Penetration Levels
As we have seen, the share of the national market supplied by imports
can be an important factor influencing both the desire of firms in an in-
dustry to lobby for higher import tariffs and the government's policy pri-
orities. But what factors affect the level of import penetration itself? The
natural way to analyze the determinants of import penetration is to as-
sume that for a given level of domestic demand for a good g, the de-
mand function for imports of this good takes the following form:
Mg = Mg(
F
g
H
g pp / , τg), (3.1)
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where Fg
H
g pp /  is the ratio of producer's unit prices at home and abroad,
and τg denotes the trade costs function that makes the domestic price of
imported goods higher than the producer's unit price abroad (this func-
tion takes into account import tariffs, transportation costs, security of
property rights on imported goods, etc.). In studying Russian foreign
trade where inter-industry trade flows prevail, it seems appropriate to
assume that the ratio of the producer's unit prices is determined pre-
dominantly by forces described by the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin theory.
Once again, the simplest way to explain the ratio of producer's unit
prices would be to take into account factor intensities of production of a
good g in Russia and abroad. Assume there are only two productive
factors, capital K and labor L. Then, if Kgα  and 
L
gα  are factor intensities
while KH/KF and LH/LF are the relative endowments of a country with
these factors as compared with the "outside world", one can write
F
g
H
g pp /  = Φ(
K
gα , 
L
gα , KH/KF, LH/LF). (3.2)
This formulation, however, assumes that the production technology at
home and abroad is exactly the same. If home-produced and imported
goods are of different quality as is common in intra-industry trade (Gre-
enaway and Torstensson, 1998), this assumption seems to be not very
realistic. Due to this fact, expression (3.2) could be re-written as
F
g
H
g pp /  = Φ(
HK
gα , 
HL
gα , KH/KF, LH/LF, q), (3.2')
where HKgα  è 
HL
gα  are factor intensities of production at home and q is a
quality index measuring the degree of quality difference between home-
produced and imported varieties of a given good. The quality index is
used here to reflect technological differences of production at home and
abroad. We prefer not to make any a priori assumptions about the rela-
tionship between the degree of quality differences and factor intensities
of production (arguments in favor of these assumptions can be found,
for example, in Favley, 1981 and Greenaway and Milner, 1986). Instead,
the quality index can be reasonably interpreted as a proxy for economies
of scale. There could be two justifications for this interpretation, the
first related to the fixed costs of product development (which are in most
cases higher for the higher-quality varieties of a given good) and
the second related to the imperfect substitutability between higher
quality varieties, which influences the ratio of average to marginal
costs under monopolistic competition (Greenaway and Torstensson,
1998, p. 3). However, there is no reason to make special assumptions on
the nature of the market competition for goods imported to Russia, and
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thus only the first factor is of interest here: the higher the quality of a
given product variety, the higher the fixed costs of product development,
so the scale of operation (and thus the ability to "distribute" these costs
among a larger number of items produced) becomes an important factor
in price competitiveness.
Using quality differences as an indicator of economies-of-scale differ-
ences between Russia and the "outside world" and relying on the
message of the New Trade Theory that greater exploitation of scale
economies is an important factor of trade specialization and gains
from trade,9 we could assume that the degree of scale advan-
tages/disadvantages in specific product lines (i.e., the degree to which
expanding output could allow Russian producers to increase their com-
petitiveness relative to foreign producers) can serve as a determinant of
the Russian trade structure in addition to the more traditional factor pro-
portion variables.
Arguments presented in this section allow us to proceed with the formu-
lation of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of this study.
4. ECONOMETRIC MODELS
4.1. The Endogenous Protection Model
The Endogenous Protection model is intended to reflect the impact of
political economy variables on government policies with respect to indi-
vidual industries:
Rate = b1 + b2ShImpij + b3∆Out + b4NEnt + b5Sh4 +
    +b6AvSales + b7ShImpI +b8ShEmp + b9Loss + b10DInt + ε1, (4.1)
where
Rate is the nominal rate of ad valorem tariffs or ad valorem components
of compound tariffs, 1997;
ShImpij is the measure of import penetration, 1997 (see below);
∆Out is the rate of change in physical volume of output during the period
1990 – 1997 (output decline in 1990 – 1997, per cent);
                                               
9 For the basic models, see Krugman (1979, 1980). A detailed survey of the ar-
guments on the role of scale economies in perfect, monopolistic and oligopolistic
competition settings can be found in Bhagwati et al. (1998), chapters 11 and 30.
For a broader theoretical discussion, see Krugman (1995).
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NEnt is the number of enterprises in an industry, 1997 (we use detailed
data for some 65 industries);
Sh4 is the market share of the four largest firms (for 27 broad industrial
groups);
AvSales is the average value of output per enterprise, 1997 (calculated
according to the formula AvSales = VQ/NEnt, where VQ is the value of
national output of a commodity);
ShImpIj is the share of imports of a given commodity in Russian imports
from non-CIS countries (j = 1) or in the total volume of Russian imports
(j = 2), 1997 (in per cent);
ShEmp is the share of employment in an industry in the total employ-
ment in manufacturing, 1997 (in per cent, for 27 industrial groups);
Loss is the share of loss-making enterprises in an industry (in per cent,
for 27 industrial groups), 1997;
DInt is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 for intermediate goods
and the value of 0 for consumer goods.
The choice of the independent variables is closely related to the
arguments presented in the previous section. Import penetration and
output variables characterizing the market situation for individual com-
modity types (ShImpij and ∆Out) could serve as important explanatory
variables for tariff rates according to the logic of the pressure group
hypothesis and "the conservative social welfare" motive of the govern-
ment.10 The variables NEnt, Sh4, AvSales, and DInt are intended to re-
flect the logic of the pressure group hypothesis.11 The higher the number
of enterprises (NEnt), the more acute the free-rider problem in a pres-
sure group and the less effective the lobbying; on the contrary, higher
industry concentration (measured by the market share of the four largest
firms, Sh4) is associated with higher lobbying contributions. In turn, the
                                               
10 As far as the pressure group hypothesis is concerned, output decline — even
independent of the dynamics of imports — reduces opportunity costs of lobbying
and thus could increase stimuli for pressure group activity. This applies, of
course, to "moderate" rates of output decline only, since in case of severe and
protracted output shock, firms could be deprived of resources necessary for lob-
bying.
11 While a tariff is a kind of public good for the enterprises operating in an indus-
try, there are of course various regulatory mechanisms of the private good type
(such as subsidies, tax exemptions, etc.). As in our previous study, we rely on a
rather plausible assumption that the possibilities to receive these enterprise-
specific transfers do not undermine the desire to lobby for industry-specific tariffs,
other things being equal.
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variable AvSales approximates the volume of sales.12 It is important to
note that Russian statistics present data for enterprises, not for compa-
nies, so we are not able to take into account the fact that several plants
could be controlled by the same company; this limitation must be taken
into account when interpreting our results. Finally, the dummy variable
for intermediate good sectors (DInt) should allow us to capture the pos-
sible tariff escalation bias associated with the lobbying process (Case 2
in Section 3.2).13
Let us now consider government motives that are not related to the
maximization of lobbying contributions. If the government maximizes the
conservative social welfare function, it could try to assist with the tariffs
primarily those industries that employ a large number of workers
(ShEmp) and suffer from an adverse financial situation (Loss). The num-
ber of enterprises in the respective industries (NEnt) could also be used
to control for the size and the geographical dispersion of the "industrial
electorate."14 On the other hand, if the government is revenue-
constrained and its major concern is associated with maximizing tariff
revenues, it could pay principal attention to levying high tariffs on those
items that account for the highest share in imports (ShImpIj). In this case
it can receive the highest revenues from a given percentage increase in
tariff rates, while at the same time abstain from increasing tariffs on
"less important" import articles and thus from inducing additional distor-
tions in the economy.
In our previous study we have found that the variables associated with
the conservative social welfare motive and the revenue motive (Cases 3
and 4 in Section 3.2) provide the best explanation of the tariff structure
in Russia. To describe this effect, the "stagnant industries – tariff reve-
nues" hypothesis was introduced. The introduction of more elaborate
variables intended to test the pressure group hypothesis (Cases 1 and 2)
allows one to take into account both possible lines of argument. Table 2
contains information on the expected direction of influence exercised by
                                               
12 The other reason why this variable could be important for the activity of pres-
sure groups (besides the reason described in the previous section) is that a
higher scale of operations implies higher costs of entry, and thus lower probability
of the dissipation of rents associated with protection.
13 As distinct from Case 1 in Section 3.2, we concentrate our attention here only
on variables related to the activity of pressure groups, and thus ignore the possi-
ble interest of the government in raising tariff revenues.
14 As the variables NEnt and ShEmp in our database refer to different levels of
aggregation, we will be able to answer the question concerning the preferences of
the government to support broad versus specialized industrial groups.
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each independent variable on tariff rates, with the signs "+" and "–" de-
noting positive and negative influence, respectively.
Table 2. The Expected Influence of Independent Variables on Tariff Rates.
Independent Variables
The pressure
group
hypothesis
The stagnant
industries – tariff
revenues hypothesis
Import penetration (ShImpij) + +
Output decline (∆Out) + +
Number of enterprises (NEnt) – +
Industry concentration (Sh4) +
Average level of sales (AvSales) +
Share in total imports (ShImpIj) +
Share of employment (ShEmp) +
Share of loss-making enterprises (Loss) +
Intermediate goods dummy (DInt) –
The easiest to calculate variable to be used as a measure of import
penetration is the share of imports in national consumption in physical
terms. This variable has some limitations, however. First, it does not take
into account quality differentiation of trade articles imported and pro-
duced at home. To control for the quality differences, we should analyze
the value measures of import penetration, assuming that the prices for
home-produced and for imported articles reflect the quality dimensions
important to consumers (this proposition is widely used in research
practice; see, e.g., Torstensson, 1991; Greenaway et al., 1995). Second,
some trade goods (e.g., photo cameras) are intensively re-exported from
Russia, so that the total volume of imports exceeds the volume of na-
tional consumption. As the measures of import penetration exceeding
the 100 per cent level have quite ambiguous meaning, it is also worth
considering the share of the total market served by imported goods.
Therefore, we propose to use various measures of the market share of
imports — ShImpij (the subscript i here denotes the method of calcula-
tion, whereas the subscript j denotes the type of trade flows: j = 1 for
trade with non-CIS countries and j = 2 for the total foreign trade):
ShImp1j is the physical measure of import penetration on the national mar-
ket calculated according to the formula ShImp1j = 
∗
jM 100/(Q + Mj – Ej),
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where Mj is the physical volume of imports, Q is the physical volume of
national output, and Ej is the physical volume of exports;
ShImp2j is the value measure of import penetration on the national market
calculated according to the formula ShImp2j = V
∗
jM 100/(VQ + VMj – VEj),
where VMj is the value of imports, VQ is the value of national output, and
VEj is the value of exports;
ShImp3j is the physical share of the total market (i.e., the national market
as well as the market for exports) served by imports, calculated accord-
ing to the formula ShImp3j = 
∗
jM 100/(Q + Mj);15
ShImp4j is the value share of the total market served by imports, calcu-
lated according to the formula ShImp4j = V
∗
jM 100/(VQ + VMj).16
Our set of import penetration variables is not without deficiencies, how-
ever. They refer to the registered imports only, and thus characterize the
levels of import penetration observed by the government rather than
faced by pressure groups. Thus, the data at hand are more adequate for
testing the stagnant industries – tariff revenues hypothesis than the
pressure group hypothesis. In the latter case, the government reacts not
to the observed levels of import penetration but rather to the lobbying
contributions that depend on the "real" levels of import penetration.
There are at least three major sources of difference between the offi-
cially registered and "real" volume of imports. First, a significant part of
imported goods enters Russia through the so-called "shuttle trade"
channels (i.e., being imported by individuals rather than legal entities)
evading registration by customs officials. Second, since 1995 trade with
Belarus is exempt from customs treatment (according to the Goskomstat
figures, in 1997 imports from Belarus totaled $4.626 billion, compared
with $53.039 billion of registered imports). Goskomstat corrections for
                                               
15 From this point on we will use the terms "import penetration" and "market
share of imports" interchangeably for the sake of simplicity, though it should be
kept in mind that for the total market (embracing national as well as export mar-
kets) the term "market share of imports" is more appropriate.
16 Values of the variables Mj, Ej, VMj, VEj are taken directly from the foreign trade
statistics (The Customs Statistics of Russian Foreign Trade for 1997). The variable
Q is taken from The Industry in Russia yearbook for 1997. To calculate the vari-
able VQ, we multiply the variable Q by the weighted export price index P calcu-
lated according to the formula:
P = (VE1/E1)×(VE1/VE2) + [(VE2 – VE1)/(E2 – E1)]×[(VE2 – VE1)/VE2)],
where VE1 is the value of exports to non-CIS countries, VE2 is the value of total
exports, (VE2 – VE1) is the value of exports to CIS countries; the variables E1,
(E2 – E1), and E2 refer to the physical volume of exports to non-CIS countries, CIS
countries, and total exports, respectively.
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these two sources of non-registered imports for 1997 amount to
$20.421 billion, with the total imports estimated at $73.460 billion. Third,
Russian importers intensively use various "grey-import" schemes ranging
from misspecifying imported goods as articles destined for re-export to
misreporting the type of goods.17 Given the three problems specified, is
there any sense to use official import data to test propositions that have
to do with the pressure group hypothesis?
The most straightforward case for the positive answer on this question is
that any other "explicit" data are absent. "Shadow" imports, by the very
nature of this word, are unobserved imports, and any non-official esti-
mates are in fact nothing more than rough guesses. Nevertheless, one
could suggest that some import positions are more likely to attract
shadow importers than others. This line of reasoning, meanwhile, leads
us to our second argument: given the prevalent demand pattern, it is
likely that the share of shadow imports is higher just for those goods that
are intensively imported through the official channels. Thus, official data
on import penetration could serve as a reasonable proxy for the "true"
import penetration (this argument applies for capital as well as consumer
goods, whereas in the former case in which the "shuttle" imports are
apparently negligible, the possibilities to misspecify imported items or to
transport them through Belarus are still open). Finally, we have a kind of
asymmetric ex post verification criterion: if we find no relationship be-
tween import penetration and tariff rates, it could of course be sug-
gested that this result is due to the invalid specification of the import
penetration variables; if, on the contrary, we do find a relationship of the
predicted sort, it would mean that the import penetration variables cho-
sen, despite all their deficiencies, allow us to capture at least some fea-
tures of the political economy process.
4.2. The Import Penetration Model
This model is used to assess the degree of import penetration in differ-
ent industries assuming that levels of trade protection are determined
exogenously. According to equation (3.2') in Section 3.3, inter-industry
differences in import penetration are explained in terms of factor intensi-
                                               
17 E.g., chicken (with a 25 per cent tariff rate) was misspecified as turkey (with a
15 per cent tariff rate), TV-sets (for which a compound tariff rate with a 30 per
cent ad valorem component is applied) was misspecified as consumer electrical
machines (with a 20 per cent ad valorem tariff rate), flowers (with a 25 per cent
tariff rate) were misspecified as greenery (with a 5 per cent tariff rate), to cite the
most notorious examples of the period under consideration.
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ties of production, and the level of scale economies is approximated by
the quality index variable:
ShImpij = 1b′  + 2b′ Rate + 3b′ PhCap + 4b′ Mat + 5b′ Lab1 +
           + 6b′ Lab2 + 7b′ HCap + 8b′ Qual + ε2; (4.2)
where
PhCap is the measure of capital intensity calculated as the share of am-
ortization in total production costs (in per cent);
Mat is the measure of material intensity calculated as the share of ex-
penditures on raw materials, semi-finished goods and other materials in
total production costs (in per cent);
Lab1 is the measure of labor intensity calculated as a share of wages in
total production costs (in per cent);
Lab2 is the alternative measure of labor intensity calculated as a share of
total labor expenses (i.e., expenses on wages as well as various social
payments) in total production costs (in per cent);
HCap is the measure of human capital intensity calculated as the share
of professionals (engineers, technicians, managers, etc.) in the industrial
labor force;
Qualj is the index of quality differences in intra-industry trade as re-
flected by the differences in prices for imported and exported goods in
trade with non-CIS countries (j = 1) and in total foreign trade (j = 2).
All independent variables are taken for the year 1997. The variables
PhCap, Mat, Lab1, Lab2, and HCap are calculated for 27 industrial sec-
tors;18 the variables Rate and Qual are taken for individual commodity
types.
In the Import Penetration model, the variable Rate holds for the trade
costs, and the variables PhCap through HCap denote factor intensities of
production. In these respects, the structure of our model resembles that
of Trefler's model (1993). Giving principal attention to the comparative
advantage variables seems to be quite reasonable in the Russian case
due to the key roles attributed to them in explaining the trade between
developing and developed countries (Helpman, 1999), with the devel-
                                               
18 It should be noted that these variables representing production cost shares do
not actually sum up to 100 per cent. Russian statistics also include "other costs"
that comprise taxes, payments for services provided by other organizations, leas-
ing payments, etc.
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oped countries being the main trade partners of Russia. Moreover, the
analysis of comparative advantage may be fruitful even for studying
problems usually addressed within the framework of the New Trade The-
ory (Davis, 1997).
We also include in our Import Penetration model the variable Qualj, which
is intended to characterize technological differences in production at
home and abroad. We assume that foreign trade in the same commodi-
ties takes the form of vertical intra-industry trade, i.e., trade in goods
with varied quality reflected in price differences. As is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3, these quality differences could reasonably be interpreted as re-
flecting differences in the role of scale economies in production at home
and abroad (i.e., higher Qualj means higher relative scale economies
of foreign producers). Thus, the variable Qualj is implied to capture
scale economies in addition to the more traditional Hecksher – Ohlin
factor intensities. This variable is calculated according to the following
formulas:
Qual1 = (VM1/M1)/(VE1/E1), (4.3)
Qual2 = (VM2/M2)/(VE2/E2). (4.4)
Formula (4.3) is used in models for trade with non-CIS countries,
whereas formula (4.4) is used in models for total foreign trade.
4.3. The Simultaneous Equations Model
In this model, we recognize explicitly the fact that the process of en-
dogenous trade policy formation responds to changes in the economic
environment (in our case, to changes in import penetration), and these
changes are in turn influenced by the level of tariff rates. Note that at the
beginning of 1992, Russia abolished all import barriers, so the absolute
levels of tariff rates in 1997 correspond to the absolute changes in tariff
rates during the period 1992 – 1997. The model under consideration
supposes simultaneous estimation of the Endogenous Protection equa-
tion and the Import Penetration equation. Inspection of this model would
allow us to
• compare the predictive value of the independent versus simultaneous
estimation of equations (4.1) and (4.3);
• analyze the impact of independent variables on the level of tariff rates
and import penetration, with special attention given to the coefficients
of the tariff rate variable in the Import Penetration equation and the
impact of political economy variables on tariff levels;
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• use alternative instrumented variables to estimate the "true" impact
of tariff rates on import flows, and vice versa.
Note that models in Sections 4.1 – 4.2 are formulated in such a way
as to exclude supplementary endogenous effects. For example, tariffs
can influence the level of employment and losses in an industry; how-
ever, the variable Rate refers to individual commodity types whereas
the variables ShEmp and Loss refer to the broad industrial groups.
Likewise, tariff protection could prevent output decline; meanwhile,
the variable ∆Out in our models measures the degree of output de-
cline since 1990, not 1992, when the new Russian tariff structure be-
gan to be formed. Thus, we do not expect to face regressor endoge-
neity problems.
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
5.1. Main Results of the Econometric Analysis
For the purpose of the econometric analysis, the database was con-
structed comprising 113 commodity types for which Russian statistical
publications present data satisfying the following criteria: (1) foreign
trade statistics are available for both the physical volume and the value
of trade flows, and (2) physical units used in foreign trade and output
statistics are identical. These commodity types account for 21.10 per
cent of Russian imports from non-CIS countries and 21.89 per cent of
total Russian imports. Table A1 contains the basic information on the in-
dependent as well as dependent variables calculated from the database.
In Tables A2a – A2c, correlation matrixes for the independent variables
are presented. As one can readily confirm, the choice of independent
variables has in fact guaranteed the absence of significant correlation
within the group of the "basic" variables (Table A2a). At the same time,
all import penetration variables (ShImpij) are closely correlated to each
other (Table A2b). Another feature is that the variables Mat and Lab2 are
correlated with other production factor variables (Table A2c). Thus, when
estimating the Import Penetration model, we should rely principally on
only three production factor variables measuring shares of physical
capital costs (PhCap), basic labor costs (Lab1), and human capital inten-
sity (HCap).
As the first step of the econometric analysis, 8 variants of the Import
Penetration model (with different specifications of the import penetration
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variable) and also 8 variants of the Endogenous Protection model were
estimated. The results of these tests can be found in Tables A3
and A4a.19
As far as the Import Penetration model is concerned (Table A3), in
neither case does the tariff rates variable exercise a statistically sig-
nificant influence on the level of import penetration. Another impor-
tant finding is that import penetration appears to be higher for labor-
intensive goods and lower for capital intensive ones. This is quite sur-
prising given the widespread appeals to the "cheap labor force" and
the "worthless physical capital" in Russia.20
Our measure of human capital intensity does not seem to serve as an
important determinant of import penetration. As far as the quality
variable is concerned, it exercises statistically significant negative im-
pact on physical measures of import penetration in trade with non-
CIS countries but positive impact on value measures of import pene-
tration in the total foreign trade. Given our interpretation of quality
differences as indicators of scale economies, the latter effect seems
to be quite natural: a higher gap between the quality of imports and
exports (in our basic interpretation, higher relative scale economies of
foreign producers) is associated with higher import penetration. At
the same time, assuming that one higher-quality item is a substitute
for several lower-quality ones, and given consumers' budget con-
straints, one can explain (though in a rather ad hoc way) lower import
                                               
19 Different variants of the Import Penetration models, when estimated in their
original formulation, demonstrated heteroscedastic properties which appeared to
be principally related with the variable Lab_1. Assuming the variance in the de-
pendent variable being proportional to the value of the variable Lab_1 (i.e.,
2
iσ = σ2 Lab_1i), coefficients in the Import Penetration model were estimated us-
ing the transformed regression model scaled by the square root of the variable
Lab_1.
20 It could be suggested that at least part of this puzzle could be explained by
the differences in productivity of labor and capital employed in different in-
dustries (just as the paradoxical pattern of factor content of trade between
developed and developing countries could be explained by factor productivity
differences in the respective countries; cf. Trefler, 1995). To test this sugges-
tion, we tried to control for the productivity effect by introducing into the Im-
port Penetration model additional variables (for 8 major industrial sectors) re-
lated to the inter-sectorial differences in wages (intended to reflect labor
productivity differences) and inter-sectoral age structure of capital (we as-
sumed that the newest capital goods tend to be the most productive ones).
Both these variables, however, appear to be statistically insignificant.
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penetration in physical terms in trade with non-CIS countries for
higher-quality goods.21
Let us turn now to the Endogenous Protection models (Table A4a). We
should note that none of the import penetration variables exercise any
statistically significant influence on tariff rates. In many other respects
the findings correspond to our expectations summarized in Table 2. The
measure of output decline, the average level of sales, the share of loss-
making enterprises and the intermediate goods dummy exercise influ-
ence on tariff rates in directions predicted by the pressure group hy-
pothesis as well as by the stagnant industries – tariff revenues hypothe-
sis. Coefficients of the commodity shares in imports are statistically
significant with the expected sign when they refer to imports from non-
CIS countries (ShImpI1) but not to total imports (ShImpI2).22
One finding that goes contrary to the logic of the pressure group hy-
pothesis but corresponds to the stagnant industries – tariff revenues hy-
pothesis is that a number of enterprises (the variable NEnt) exercises a
positive impact on tariff rates. As there is no statistically significant im-
pact of the variable ShEmp that refers to the more aggregated industrial
groups, it could be suggested that the government is able to discrimi-
nate effectively between quite specialized industrial groups.23
                                               
21 It could also be suggested that imports of goods with the highest quality gap
between foreign and domestic producers, being highly profitable, are more likely
to enter Russia through "shadow" channels, and thus we face an sort of the
"missing trade phenomenon" in the official statistics.
22 The same result was obtained in the previous study (Afontsev, 2000) for both
1996 and 1997. One possible explanation has to do with the composition of trade
with CIS and non-CIS countries: levying high tariffs on manufactured goods with
high value-added (imported principally from non-CIS countries) can generate
more budget revenues than levying tariffs on low value-added imports from the
CIS. The problem of tariff evasion can also play a role: as borders with CIS coun-
tries, as is widely recognized, were "semi-limpid" for the most part of the 1990s,
concentration on imports from non-CIS countries was the most adequate strategy
to maximize tariff revenues.
23 An alternative interpretation could also be proposed: there could be "two-tier"
lobbying, with enterprises appealing to regional authorities and State Duma (the
Russian parliament) representatives to use their own lobbying potential to address
the government. If so, as a higher number of enterprises could reflect the
geographical dispersion of industries, their interests will be represented by a
higher number of regional officials and MPs. Moreover, as has been noted in
Section 4.1, our models do not take into account the possibilities of overlapping
corporate ownership or membership of several enterprises in financial-industrial
groups (indeed, these possibilities could be of crucial importance for pressure
group activity in the real world). This fact should be kept in mind when interpreting
regression results.
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Econometric findings presented thus far seem to correspond to the initial
skeptical view on the analytical potential of independent treatment of the
Endogenous Protection model and the Import Penetration model. In
these models, neither tariff rates influence the import penetration level
nor do import penetration measures influence the level of tariff rates. We
should thus proceed to the exercise of verifying expectations about the
simultaneous treatment of these models. As a step for this exercise, we
performed the Hausman test for endogeneity by introducing values of
the tariff rate variable predicted from the different variants of the En-
dogenous Protection model into the respective variants of the Import
Penetration model, and, in turn, the import penetration variables pre-
dicted from the different variants of the Import Penetration model into
the respective variants of the Endogenous Protection model.
The results are noteworthy. Tariff rates predicted from the Endogenous
Protection models exercise statistically significant positive impact on the
import penetration variables, which of course can not be explained by
any reasonable line of argument related to the impact of tariff rates on
import flows.24
On the contrary, the inclusion of the predicted import penetration vari-
ables — EST(ShImpij) — into the Endogenous Protection model leads to a
notable improvement in the model performance. This effect is evident
from Table A4b. These instrumented variables are always highly signifi-
cant with the predicted sign. At the same time, in contrast to the "inde-
pendent" estimation of the Endogenous Protection model, the coefficient
of the output decline variable ∆Out turns out to be statistically insignifi-
cant, while the coefficient of the industry concentration variable Sh4 be-
comes statistically significant with the predicted sign. The impact of the
variables Loss and DInt is significantly weakened and could be found
principally in the models for total foreign trade, while in the models for
trade with non-CIS countries (which as a rule explain a larger portion of
variation in tariff rates), it is less obvious.
As could be seen from Table A4b, the "two-stage" endogenous protec-
tion model for the variable of the market share of imports in value terms
in trade with non-CIS countries (ShImp21) outperforms all alternative
specifications. Tariff rates predicted from this model seem to be quite
reasonable. It is especially interesting to analyze outliers of the model,
i.e., cases when predicted tariff rates deviate significantly from the actual
ones. In two cases, the model predicts negative tariff rates; no wonder,
                                               
24 We experimented also with a dummy variable for the commodity groups for
which compound tariffs are imposed. Its inclusion does not change the results
presented above.
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these cases are crude oil and natural gas, i.e., commodities in which
Russia has the most favorable export position. In the case of chicken
meat, higher actual tariff rates are quite natural in the light of intensive
and well-publicized protectionist campaigns throughout the 1990s. On
the contrary, actual tariff rates are much lower than predicted for agri-
cultural machines, mining equipment, railway coaches, salt, bread, corn
oil, and baby food. These commodities are usually considered by the
government to be either "socially important" or crucial for the economy
due to the lack of adequate local substitutes. In the case of the fish
products and coal low tariff rates could be due to the endowments in
specific natural resources. Thus, ad hoc arguments seem to provide
quite reasonable explanations for major (but of course not all) model
outliers.
What do the findings presented in this section tell us as far as the under-
standing of the mechanism of tariff protection is concerned?
• First, tariff rates appear to exercise no negative impact on the meas-
ures of import penetration, which is, of course, a quite unexpected find-
ing. The most probable reason is that the degree of variation in tariff
rates was radically reduced by the decision made in 1996 to fix the
maximum tariff rate at the 30 per cent level (this decision was in fact in-
spired by IMF recommendations). What is even more surprising, import
penetration is higher for labor intensive goods and lower for capital in-
tensive goods. Part of this puzzle could be explained by the fact that im-
port penetration appears to be higher for consumer goods due to the
significant demand for higher quality imported goods by consumers, as
well as the liquidity constraint on Russian producers, who often do not
have the money to buy more productive but at the same time more ex-
pensive imported equipment. As producer goods tend to be more capital
intensive than consumer goods, the counterintuitive import pattern could
reflect not the presumed "efficiency" of Russian capital intensive indus-
tries, but solely demand conditions. However, this explanation is not uni-
versal. For example, when we consider only consumer goods (DInt = 0),
the positive relationship between labor intensity and import penetration is
even more pronounced.25
                                               
25 For example, in the model with the value measure of the import penetration in
trade with non-CIS countries (ShImp21) the coefficient of the variable Lab_1 rises
from 1.65 to 3.27, while its beta coefficient rises from 0.13 to 0.25 (this means
that a one-standard-deviation change in the value of the variable Lab_1 in the
transformed model changes the import penetration variable by 0.25 standard de-
viation). This fact suggests that the regularity found is unlikely to be induced by
the deficiency of the official data, as the structure of "shadow" imports is much
more biased toward consumer goods than the structure of registered imports.
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• Second, the lack of a negative effect of the tariff rate measures pre-
dicted from the Endogenous Protection model on the market share of
imports in the Import Penetration model forces us to reject our initial as-
sumption of "two-way" endogeneity, with the import penetration variable
affecting the level of tariff rates, and vice versa. Thus, we can treat im-
port penetration levels as "independent" of the political economy proc-
esses that determine tariff rates.
• Third, the import penetration variable predicted from the Import
Penetration model, when introduced into the Endogenous Protection
model, exercises a highly significant impact on tariff rates and assures a
noticeable rise in the predictive value of the model, while most of the
other variables exercise an impact on tariff rates in agreement with the
logic of endogenous policy theory. Moreover, many outliers of the model
are amenable to plausible interpretation.
The results presented above could be judged as robust only if they do
not depend on the choice of commodity types included in our database.
As the main principle of the database formation and the calculation of
independent variables was that of data availability, we should perform
extensive sensitivity analysis to make sure that the findings presented
above are not influenced by some bias in the available data.
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis
First of all, it is worth testing the sensitivity of the results described in the
previous section to changes in the industry set of observations. For this
purpose, we should see whether the omission of observations for differ-
ent industrial sectors would influence the results significantly. Detailed
results for 8 broad industrial sectors are presented in Tables A5, A6a,
and A6b.26
One can easily make sure from Table A5 that a statistically significant
negative relationship between the measure of physical capital intensity
and the level of import penetration is evident in all specifications (though
                                               
26 As the Endogenous Protection model for the value measure of the import
penetration in trade with non-CIS countries (ShImp21) appeared to perform best,
sensitivity analysis results are presented here for both the Import Penetration
model and the Endogenous Protection model where this variable is employed. We
also estimated the Import Penetration model as well as the Endogenous Protec-
tion model with the omission of observations for 27 less aggregated industries.
The results of these tests, while supporting the general findings, are less repre-
sentative because the number of commodities associated with these industries
varies significantly (from 1 to 19).
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the coefficient of this variable fluctuates from 0.98 to 4.47). The impact
of the labor intensity measure is always positive and statistically signifi-
cant (with one exception); in those variants where it is statistically signifi-
cant, its coefficient varies much less, from 1.29 to 2.10. However, the
beta coefficients for the physical capital intensity measure are as a rule
higher.
One interesting finding is that our measure of human capital intensity is
highly significant when observations for the food industry are excluded.
We could thus suppose that the food industry is in some sense an "out-
lier" in our database.27 At the same time, neither tariff rates nor the
quality variable exercise the expected impact on the degree of import
penetration.
To explore the sensitivity of the Endogenous Protection model to the ex-
clusion of industry observations, two tests were performed:
• the "soft" test, where the import penetration variables predicted from
the basic variant of the Import Penetration model (presented in the
second column of Table A5) were used, and
• the "strong" test, where the import penetration variables were pre-
dicted from the Import Penetration models in which the observations
for the respective industries were excluded (actually, from the Import
Penetration models in columns 3 – 10 of Table A5).
The first test controls for industry-specific sources of variation peculiar to
the endogenous protection mechanism. In turn, the "strong" test con-
trols for two sources of variation peculiar both to the trade sphere and to
the endogenous protection mechanism. In a sense, it rests on quite
strong assumptions. It addresses the following question: what would
have been the political economy mechanism of tariff protection in Russia
if its foreign trade had "lost" one of its sectors, with trade flows in all
other sectors being unaffected. For the results of these tests, see Tables
A6a and A6b.
One striking finding from the different specifications of the Endogenous
Protection model is that the impact of the predicted import penetration
variable EST(ShImp21) is highly significant (when judged by both
t-statistic and beta coefficients) in all specifications of both tests. Moreo-
ver, coefficients of this variable are quite reasonable: in our "soft" test,
                                               
27 Indeed, the food industry items in the database could be classified into four
sub-industries: nutrition (13 observations), meat & milk (9 observations), fish
(5 observations), and flour (3 observations). The statistically significant impact of
the measure of human capital intensity appears only when the observations for
the nutrition industry are omitted.
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they vary from 0.41 to 0.56, while in the "strong" test, which rests on
much more radical assumptions, they range from 0.30 to 0.58.
Among other independent variables, the "less stable" performers are the
variables characterizing the employment share (Emp), the share of loss-
making enterprises (Loss), and the intermediate product dummy (DInt).
The signs of the coefficients of these variables generally agree with our
expectations, though their statistical significance depends on excluding
different industry observations.
On the other hand, the impact of the group of variables characterizing
the number of enterprises (NEnt), industry concentration (Sh4), average
sales (AvSales), and the share in total imports (ShImpI1) is much more
stable. Note also that the beta coefficients for the variables NEnt, Sh4,
and ShImpI1 are generally much higher than for the variable AvSales,
signifying a higher economic significance of these variables in explaining
possible changes in tariff rates.
As in the case of the Import Penetration model, the industries whose ex-
clusion leads to the most important changes in the regularities observed
are the machine-building and the food industry. Note, however, that the
exclusion of the observations for these industries neither "neutralizes"
the impact of the predicted import penetration variable nor gives rise to
any statistically significant effect in contrast with our expectations con-
cerning the impact of individual variables.
As the impact of some independent variables in the Endogenous Protec-
tion model is sensitive to the exclusion of industry observations, it is
worth studying the sensitivity of the Endogenous Protection model to the
exclusion of different independent variables. This issue is addressed in
Table A7. The predicted import penetration variable is the most signifi-
cant variable in the sense of the values of the beta coefficients, and its
impact is quite insensitive to the exclusion of other independent variables
(with the coefficient of this variable in the range from 0.43 to 0.48). The
other variables have lower beta coefficients, and thus their exclusion af-
fects the predictive power of the model less significantly than the exclu-
sion of the predicted import penetration variable.
This observation allows us to stress the validity of using official data
on imports in our empirical analysis despite the problems noted in Sec-
tion 4.1. Indeed, by identifying the import structure as explained by fac-
tor proportions and technology, we approximate the "true" levels of im-
port penetration as distinct from those directly observed by the official
statistics. The fact that the impact of these "approximated" import
penetration variables is always highly stable in all sensitivity specifica-
tions supports ex post the adequacy of our modeling procedure.
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Coefficients of the variables NEnt (the number of enterprises), Sh4 (in-
dustry concentration), AvSales (average sales), and ShImpI1 (the share
in total volume of imports from non-CIS countries) are also stable and
statistically significant, while the coefficients on the variables Loss (the
share of loss-making enterprises) and DInt (intermediate goods dummy)
are statistically significant (with the expected sign) only when some other
variables are excluded. In models which include the predicted import
penetration variable, the variables ∆Out and ShEmp are never statistically
significant, and their beta coefficients are very low.
Thus, we can conclude that the findings described in the previous sec-
tion are reasonably stable to the exclusion of observations for different
industry groups and independent variables. Moreover, such exclusion
sometimes provides new information on the behavior of the variables
whose impact was found to be not statistically significant in the basic
formulation of the models. This means that we succeeded in capturing
some profound aspects of the import protection process as well as im-
portant determinants of the import penetration structure.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have found that the tariff formation process in the institutional setting
that evolved in Russia during the 1992 – 1997 period appears to be sig-
nificantly influenced by different political economy factors that are ad-
dressed within the endogenous protection theory. The most important
findings could be summarized as follows.
• The level of import penetration seems to be unaffected by tariff rates.
No traces of the negative influence of tariff rates (whether actual or pre-
dicted) on the level of import penetration were discovered. The main
cause of this rather paradoxical result is almost certainly the decision
taken by the Russian government in 1996 to set the maximum tariff rate
at the 30 per cent level. This decision was in fact inspired by IMF rec-
ommendations related to tariff unification, one of the conditions con-
nected to providing IMF credits. Thus, the interaction with an external in-
stitutional entity limited the scope for political choice for Russian
decision-makers; as a result, the variation in tariff rates has been sub-
stantially lower that the variation in most other variables, as can be seen
from Table A1. This "neutrality" of tariff rates does not mean, however,
that the effects of protection are entirely harmless, as import tariffs in
any case exercise upward pressure on domestic prices and thus redis-
tribute income from consumers to producers.
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• There are convincing signs of a counterintuitive relation between the
factor cost shares and the measures of import penetration. The observa-
tion that Russian imports appear to be labor intensive rather than capital
intensive contradicts the stylized beliefs about the structure of compara-
tive advantage in Russian foreign trade. Our test of the effect of inter-
sectoral productivity differences failed to discover any statistically signifi-
cant relationship. Thus, further study is needed to identify the determi-
nants of the Russian import structure in lines with the recent efforts to
explain the apparent contradictions between trade patterns in the real
world and the predictions of the Hecksher – Ohlin – Vanek theorem.
• Import penetration determined by factor intensity variables appears to
be the most important determinant of tariff rates. In contrast with the
more traditional endogenous protection models that use actual values of
import penetration, our models with the predicted import penetration
variables allow us to explain a substantially higher share of variation in
tariff rates. The impact of the predicted import penetration variables is
highly stable in respect to the set of industry observations as well as
other variables included in the Endogenous Protection model. Thus, we
can conclude that the institutional system of tariff policy formation in
Russia favors protection of industries whose low competitiveness in for-
eign trade is caused by the comparative advantage factors.
• No single hypothesis could be interpreted as an unambiguous expla-
nation of the tariff formation process. Statistically significant impact on
tariff rates is exercised by variables which refer to both hypotheses pre-
sented in Section 4.1. On the one hand, the impact of industry concen-
tration (Sh4) and the average level of sales (AvSales) — as well as the
impact of the intermediate goods dummy in some sensitivity specifica-
tions — corresponds to the logic of the pressure group hypothesis. On
the other hand, the impact of the variables characterizing the number of
enterprises (NEnt) and the share in imports from non-CIS countries
(ShImpI1), as well as the share in total employment (ShEmp) and the
share of loss-making enterprises (Loss) in some sensitivity specifica-
tions, supports the stagnant industries – tariff revenues hypothesis. As
can be seen, the theoretical framework proposed in Sections 3.1 – 3.2
provides some kind of synthetic analytical description of the tariff-setting
mechanism operating in Russia during the transition period.
Our findings confirm the assumption common in the literature on en-
dogenous protection that political economy factors play the principal role
in the tariff formation process. In this setting, is there any scope for
trade policy improvements, given (1) the desire of policy makers to pro-
vide at least moderate support for stagnant industries, (2) the role of
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tariff revenues in financing government expenditures, and (3) the evi-
dence of pressure group influence on government decisions?
The most straightforward conclusion one could be tempted to make is
that the necessary condition for changing the "protectionist" attitude to a
more liberal one is the substitution of "political technocrats" for "political
opportunists" in key decision making positions and/or restructuring the
entire institutional mechanism of trade policy formation to impose con-
straints on decision makers, forcing them to reject the protectionist bias.
However, radical proposals of this sort rest on rather shaky foundations.
Institutional structures are often not easy to change, and a benevolent
political technocrat is a rara avis indeed. It seems that a much more re-
alistic way of addressing the problem would be to analyze the possibili-
ties of meeting government preferences while at the same time reducing
the degree of distortions introduced in the economy.
As was suggested above, the obligation not to raise tariffs above the 30
per cent level decreased the scope of the government's autonomy in
tariff policy and thus limited the impact of tariff policy on trade flows, as
indicated by the absence of any statistically significant impact of tariff
rates on import penetration levels. Further reduction of the maximum
tariff rate with the appropriate adjustments in the tariff structure will
hardly affect the level of import penetration (given our finding about the
"neutrality" of tariff rates). Thus, producers' losses from price reductions
will be moderated by the stability of the market share of imports; as a
consequence, pressure group opposition against lowering the maximum
tariff rate is unlikely to be harsh.
The "neutrality" of tariff rates also suggests that the decrease in gov-
ernment revenues due to lower tariff rates will not be compensated for,
as the import volume will not rise substantially. Thus, there could be a
temptation to make up for the loss of revenues by raising tariffs on
goods that previously enjoyed low tariff rates. This "revenue temptation"
is rather dangerous, as the cumulative effect of reducing the maximum
tariff rate while at the same time raising tariffs "from the bottom up"
would not necessarily be liberalizing. More adequate measures for rais-
ing tariff revenues include upgrading customs discipline and closing
channels for "grey" imports. These measures will not only generate ad-
ditional revenues for the budget but also raise support by import-
competing producers who would be more eager to accept the "bundle"
of government policies which supposes lower tariffs but higher barriers
for illegal imports.
Finally, there is a need to reconsider the role of tariffs in protecting stag-
nant industries. Given the large variance in enterprise performance, tar-
iffs are quite imprecise instruments of industrial policy as they "protect"
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enterprises irrespective of their ability to adjust to the prevalent degree
of import competition. Microeconomic policies of industrial restructuring
seem to be more appropriate than tariffs for raising the competitiveness
of enterprises, allowing the government not only to help these enter-
prises but also to generate additional tax revenues (and, in the case of
enterprises with government stakes in property, to raise the market value
of these stakes) due to the rise in enterprise efficiency.
In the recent years, we have been observing a trend toward trade policy
reform in lines with some of our recommendations. In September, 2000,
the Russian government approved the new concept of customs and tariff
policy prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
This concept suggests (1) lowering the maximum tariff rate from 30 per
cent to 20 per cent, (2) unification of the customs regime for goods
within broad commodity groups and (3) a variety of measures intended
to fight "grey" import schemes. On November 27, 2000, the government
approved a set of revisions to the customs tariff in lines with
this concept. New tariff rates are supposed to apply for 9 months
(January – September, 2001); then a more strategic decision should be
taken.
As far as the main principles of the concept are concerned, the first and
the third ones are quite reasonable, while the second one could be sub-
jected to what we called "revenue temptation" (raising rates within indi-
vidual commodity groups to the level applied to high-tariff articles to
undermine stimuli for misreporting them for low-tariff ones). This temp-
tation bears a risk of inducing additional distortions in the economy. It
also could be self-defeating, as positive stimuli to shift from "grey" to le-
gal import operations generated by strengthening customs discipline
would be counterbalanced by higher tariff rates. At the same time, there
are no signs that the government recognizes either the suboptimality of
the tariff policy for supporting impaired industries or the connection be-
tween tariff policy and enterprise restructuring. Thus, our recommenda-
tions do not lose their political appeal in the face of the steps toward
reform of the tariff system made during the last years.
A final word should be said regarding the problem of adjusting the Rus-
sian tariff structure in a way as to qualify for joining the World Trade Or-
ganization. Even with all their rational elements, the current tariff innova-
tions of the Russian government are very far from the WTO standards.
One can thus hope that the activation of negotiations with the WTO
member countries would force the government to reject the "revenue
temptation" and consider the restructuring option as a promising alter-
native for tariffs in the field of raising competitiveness of national enter-
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prises. In this sense, the motivation to join the WTO could have the same
liberalizing effect on the Russian tariff structure as the desire to receive
the IMF credit resources in 1996, with the lucky differences from the
latter case being the lack of "credit addiction" and speeding up the pace
of industrial growth.
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Table A1. Summary Information on the Variables of the Study.
Variable Observations Mean
Std.
Deviation
Min Max
Rate 113 12.96 7.72 0 30
ShImp11 113 24.65 27.88 0 100.7
ShImp21 113 22.53 25.76 0 122.1
ShImp31 113 22.31 26.90 0 99.8
ShImp41 113 20.09 23.64 0 99.9
ShImp12 113 30.18 29.33 0.04 121.6
ShImp22 113 27.29 28.99 0.05 172.9
ShImp32 113 25.95 27.46 0.01 99.8
ShImp42 113 23.11 24.68 0.03 99.9
∆Out 113 61.14 35.00 –184.99 97.22
NEnt 113 230.95 432.87 3 1875
Sh4 113 19.60 17.79 3.22 75.37
AvSales 113 177018.4 1117475 1.36 9946989
ShImpI1 113 0.19 0.37 0 2.28
ShImpI2 113 0.19 0.35 0 1.87
ShEmp 113 3.40 1.98 0.05 7.18
Loss 113 45.15 10.03 23.3 82.4
DInt 113 0.58 0.50 0 1
PhCap 113 6.29 2.46 3.5 18.2
Mat 113 65.14 9.01 38.2 78.8
Lab1 113 13.42 4.33 6.8 25.7
Lab2 113 18.41 5.84 9.3 35.4
HCap 113 20.65 4.73 14.71 31.15
Qual1 113 1.317 1.43 0.14 11.71
Qual2 113 2.95 8.35 0.08 71.67
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Table A2a. Correlation Matrix for Key Independent Variables.
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Table A2b. Correlation Matrix for the Import Penetration Variables.
ShImp11 ShImp21 ShImp31 ShImp41 ShImp12 ShImp22 ShImp32 ShImp42
ShImp11 1
ShImp21 0.88 1
ShImp31 0.98 0.86 1
ShImp41 0.86 0.96 0.87 1
ShImp12 0.94 0.90 0.92 0.87 1
ShImp22 0.83 0.96 0.81 0.89 0.91 1
ShImp32 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.89 0.97 0.87 1
ShImp42 0.83 0.93 0.84 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.92 1
Table A2c. Correlation Matrix for Production Factor Variables.
PhCap Mat Lab1 Lab2 HCap
PhCap 1
Mat –0.77 1
Lab1 0.26 –0.75 1
Lab2 0.27 –0.75 0.99 1
HCap 0.45 –0.45 0.26 0.27 1
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Table A3. The Import Penetration Model.
ShImp11 ShImp21 ShImp31 ShImp41 ShImp12 ShImp22 ShImp32 ShImp42
Y-intercept 14.21
1.14
–1.01
–0.08
17.63
1.49
4.69
0.45
16.65
1.18
6.03
0.39
21.27
1.63
15.53
1.34
Rate 0.47
1.19
0.41
1.11
0.38
0.98
0.34
0.93
0.40
0.95
0.32
0.82
0.27
0.66
0.26
0.68
PhCap –2.27
–2.67***
–2.19
–2.68***
–2.41
–2.85***
–2.25
–2.81***
–2.41
–2.51**
–2.35
–2.69***
–2.60
–2.70***
–2.37
–2.89***
Lab1 1.65
2.56**
1.42
2.26**
1.40
2.22**
1.01
1.77*
1.68
2.36**
1.57
2.13**
1.31
1.93*
0.93
1.59
HCap 0.07
0.11
0.58
1.06
0.09
0.16
0.51
1.07
0.0015
0.002
0.43
0.66
–0.02
–0.03
0.23
0.45
Qual1 –3.66
–1.73*
0.82
0.53
–4.36
–2.46**
0.99
0.69
Qual2 0.32
1.04
0.67
3.07***
0.12
0.33
0.70
3.79***
R2
2
aR
0.512
18.44
0.500
17.83
0.485
16.17
0.468
16.89
0.570
25.38
0.555
33.84
0.517
20.27
0.526
29.50
Comment. Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator of standard errors.
Coefficients are based on the estimation of the transformed model scaled by the square root
of the variable Lab_1.
In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second figure
stands for the value of the t-statistic.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level;
** — significant at the 5 per cent confidence level;
*** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A4a. The Endogenous Protection Model.
ShImpij=
ShImp11
ShImpij=
ShImp21
ShImpij=
ShImp31
ShImpij=
ShImp14
ShImpij=
ShImp12
ShImpij=
ShImp22
ShImpij=
ShImp32
ShImpij=
ShImp42
Y-intercept 2.80
0.78
2.43
0.68
3.14
0.78
3.16
0.87
3.86
1.03
3.53
0.96
4.57
1.21
4.42
1.18
ShImpij 0.072
0.30
0.016
0.62
–0.005
–0.20
–0.005
–0.19
0.006
0.27
0.013
0.58
–0.014
–0.59
–0.01
–0.39
∆Out 0.037
2.91*
0.035
2.71***
0.041
3.19***
0.04
3.12***
0.036
2.72***
0.034
2.53**
0.042
3.29***
0.041
3.07***
NEnt 0.0035
2.07**
0.0035
2.13**
0.0034
1.97*
0.0034
1.96*
0.037
2.28**
0.0038
2.34**
0.0036
2.10**
0.0036
2.14**
Sh4 0.07
1.57
0.075
1.63
0.069
1.51
0.069
1.50
0.078
1.61
0.079
1.65
0.071
1.51
0.073
1.52
AvSales –6.45 e–7
3.96***
–6.12 e–7
3.71***
–6.79 e–7
4.14***
–6.82 e–7
–4.06***
–6.10 e–7
–3.44***
–5.81 e–7
–3.28***
–6.84 e–7
3.83***
–6.73 e–7
–3.69***
ShImpI1 3.88
2.00**
3.79
1.97*
3.98
2.04**
3.99
2.04**
ShImpI2 1.34
0.56
1.28
0.53
1.52
0.63
1.51
0.62
ShEmp –0.036
–0.11
–0.024
–0.07
–0.021
–0.06
–0.026
–0.08
–0.043
–0.13
–0.036
–0.11
–0.026
–0.08
–0.036
–0.11
Loss 0.17
2.45**
0.17
2.57**
0.17
2.39**
0.17
2.41**
0.16
2.31**
0.17
2.40**
0.16
2.19**
0.16
2.22**
DInt –4.63
–2.80***
–4.57
–2.82***
–4.85
–2.93***
–4.82
–2.97***
–5.41
–3.40***
–5.36
–3.44***
–5.77
–3.61***
–5.63
–3.60***
R2
F
0.378
15.37
0.379
15.79
0.378
14.71
0.378
14.72
0.352
14.39
0.353
14.84
0.352
13.31
0.352
13.43
Comment. Dependent variable — Rate. Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
standard errors.
In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second figure
stands for the value of the t-statistic.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A4b. The Endogenous Protection Model with Import Penetration Variables
Predicted from the Import Penetration Model.
ShImpij=
ShImp11
ShImpij=
ShImp21
ShImpij=
ShImp31
ShImpij=
ShImp14
ShImpij=
ShImp12
ShImpij=
ShImp22
ShImpij=
ShImp32
ShImpij=
ShImp42
Y-intercept –1.26
–0.37
–3.56
–1.02
–0.96
–0.27
–5.03
–1.25
–2.98
–0.91
–1.41
–0.41
–3.55
–0.93
–1.10
–0.28
EST
(ShImpij)
0.38
5.98***
0.44
5.75***
0.32
4.19***
0.49
4.37***
0.38
4.49***
0.22
2.52**
0.39
4.18***
0.20
1.93*
∆Out 0.006
0.41
0.0038
0.248
0.015
1.00
0.0066
0.45
0.0054
0.35
0.017
1.15
0.0078
0.51
0.0229
1.58
NEnt 0.0029
2.04**
0.0036
2.58**
0.0030
1.95*
0.0035
2.40**
0.0035
2.49**
0.0037
2.55**
0.0035
2.28**
0.0036
2.34**
Sh4 0.075
2.03**
0.081
2.36**
0.074
1.83*
0.071
2.23**
0.091
2.36**
0.089
2.18**
0.089
2.16**
0.087
1.99**
AvSales –7.06 e–7
–3.22***
–5.34 e–7
–1.927*
–7.31 e–7
–4.25***
–4.77 e–7
–1.79*
–4.22 e–7
–1.84*
–4.92 e–7
–3.31***
–4.42 e–7
–1.88*
–4.68 e–7
–3.48***
ShImpI1 3.62
2.64***
3.47
2.54**
3.61
2.35**
3.13
2.21**
ShImpI2 2.34
1.19
2.08
0.98
2.19
1.05
1.69
0.77
ShEmp –0.14
–0.51
0.31
1.16
–0.18
–0.59
0.22
0.79
0.05
0.16
0.22
0.73
–0.11
–0.36
0.10
0.31
Loss –0.064
1.03
0.078
1.30
0.107
1.65
0.121
2.00**
0.084
1.32
0.13
1.92*
0.11
1.81*
0.17
2.50**
DInt –1.15
–0.81
–2.13
–1.53
–1.73
–1.11
–2.19
–1.53
–3.19
–2.14**
–4.35
–2.75***
–2.92
–1.92*
–4.62
–2.88***
R2
F
0.548
17.12
0.570
17.78
0.492
16.94
0.544
14.41
0.500
17.64
0.434
21.43
0.474
13.14
0.402
25.59
Comment. Dependent variable — Rate. Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
standard errors.
The variable EST(ShImpij) is predicted from the Import Penetration model.
In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second figure
stands for the value of the t-statistic.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A5. Sensitivity of the Import Penetration Model to the Exclusion of Obser-
vations for Different Industry Groups.
Industry group excluded:
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7.06
0.47
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–0.07
12.04
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1.87
0.15
0.03
0.00
–0.06
–0.01
–30.71
–2.62**
Rate 0.41
1.11
0.12
0.25
0.63
0.08
0.32
0.78
0.09
0.47
1.01
0.14
0.71
1.69*
0.21
0.52
1.41
0.16
0.37
0.98
0.11
0.32
0.82
0.10
0.28
1.04
0.10
PhCap –2.19
–2.68***
–0.26
–4.47
–2.47**
–0.30
–2.20
–2.68***
–0.27
–2.33
–2.58**
–0.29
–2.04
–2.38**
–0.26
–1.65
–2.08**
–0.20
–2.12
–2.61**
–0.25
–2.22
–2.75***
–0.27
–0.98
–1.89*
–0.14
Lab1 1.42
2.26**
0.12
2.10
2.41**
0.17
1.29
1.99**
0.11
1.33
1.90*
0.12
0.97
1.55
0.08
1.74
2.62***
0.15
1.53
2.33**
0.13
1.39
2.00***
0.11
1.59
2.72***
0.16
HCap 0.58
1.06
0.11
0.68
1.22
0.11
0.33
0.56
0.07
0.57
1.04
0.12
0.17
0.25
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.48
0.85
0.09
0.59
1.02
0.11
1.43
2.75***
0.35
Qual1 0.82
0.53
0.04
1.13
0.77
0.06
1.56
1.00
0.08
1.62
1.05
0.09
–2.97
–1.12
–0.11
1.14
0.66
0.06
0.77
0.50
0.04
1.00
0.65
0.05
0.89
0.69
0.06
R2
F
0.500
17.83
0.522
18.51
0.513
17.65
0.527
15.45
0.487
12.72
0.512
17.20
0.501
17.25
0.480
15.45
0.544
18.82
Comment. Dependent variable — ShImp21. Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator
of standard errors.
Number of observations omitted is in parentheses. In the table cells, the first figure stands for
the regression coefficient, the second figure stands for the value of the t-statistic, the third
figure stands for the value of the beta coefficient.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A6a. Sensitivity of the Endogenous Protection Model to the Exclusion of
Observations for Different Industry Groups — the "Soft Test".
Industry group excluded:
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1.73*
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(ShImp21)
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5.75***
0.51
0.56
6.35***
0.56
0.41
5.98***
0.48
0.47
4.93***
0.55
0.49
3.48***
0.55
0.43
5.63***
0.50
0.44
5.87***
0.52
0.41
5.24***
0.50
0.37
3.99***
0.45
∆Out 0.0038
0.25
0.02
0.0013
0.08
0.01
0.0046
0.30
0.02
0.0086
0.60
0.04
0.01
0.93
0.06
0.008
0.59
0.04
0.005
0.36
0.02
–0.0003
–0.02
–0.002
–0.03
–1.61
–0.11
NEnt 0.0036
2.58**
0.20
0.0026
2.05**
0.15
0.0037
2.70***
0.22
0.0045
3.24***
0.27
0.0040
2.57**
0.26
0.0039
2.55**
0.22
0.0042
2.90***
0.24
0.0016
0.97
0.07
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2.09**
0.13
Sh4 0.08
2.36**
0.18
0.066
2.01**
0.15
0.12
3.26***
0.28
0.09
2.46**
0.22
0.007
0.13
0.01
0.09
2.57**
0.20
0.08
2.37**
0.19
0.07
2.02**
0.18
0.016
0.38
0.04
AvSales –5.34e–7
–0.93*
–0.08
–6.31e–7
–2.32**
–0.09
–5.79e–7
–2.84***
–0.09
–5.92e–7
–2.15**
–0.08
4.41e–7
0.09
0.01
–5.12e–7
–1.84*
–0.08
–5.64e–7
–2.05**
–0.08
–5.67e–7
–2.08**
–0.09
–4.87e–7
–2.08**
–0.08
ShImpI1 3.47
2.54**
0.16
3.79
2.90***
0.19
3.63
2.59**
0.18
3.92
2.90***
0.20
2.92
1.45
0.13
3.38
2.43***
0.17
3.56
2.57**
0.17
4.09
2.90***
0.22
1.51
1.04
0.05
ShEmp 0.31
1.16
0.08
0.49
1.81*
0.13
0.66
2.57**
0.17
0.29
1.07
0.08
–0.41
–1.19
–0.10
0.30
1.10
0.08
0.29
1.08
0.07
0.13
0.43
0.03
0.08
0.19
0.02
Loss 0.08
1.30
0.10
0.12
1.94*
0.15
0.09
1.49
0.12
0.09
1.53
0.13
0.02
0.32
0.03
0.04
0.50
0.04
0.06
1.09
0.09
0.05
0.82
0.07
0.08
0.97
0.09
DInt –2.12
–1.53
–0.14
–1.73
–1.23
–0.11
–1.14
–0.83
–0.07
–1.68
–1.17
–0.11
–0.24
–0.13
–0.02
–2.63
–1.83*
–0.17
–1.47
–1.05
–0.09
–2.60
–1.82*
–0.18
–8.38
–4.76***
–0.42
R2
F
0.570
17.78
0.597
33.16
0.573
22.26
0.611
13.76
0.577
13.22
0.585
17.20
0.58
17.65
0.491
11.18
0.699
55.30
Comment. Dependent variable — Rate. The variable EST(ShImp21) is predicted from the Im-
port Penetration model.
Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator of standard errors. Number of observations
omitted is in parentheses.
In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second figure stands for
the value of the t-statistic, the third figure stands for the value of the beta coefficient.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A6b. Sensitivity of the Endogenous Protection Model to the Exclusion of
Observations for Different Industry Groups — the "Strong Test".
Industry group excluded:
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3.63
2.72***
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0.07
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2.69***
0.17
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2.64***
0.18
4.33
2.96***
0.23
2.24
1.53
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ShEmp 0.31
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0.63
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0.15
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–0.10
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0.22
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0.11
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–0.02
–0.32
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0.057
0.93
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0.07
1.00
0.09
0.16
1.84*
0.18
DInt –2.13
–1.53
–0.14
–2.26
–1.38
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–1.52
–1.07
–0.10
–1.94
–1.35
–0.12
0.88
0.59
0.06
–2.60
–1.93*
–0.17
–1.59
–1.13
–0.10
–3.03
–2.03**
–0.21
–9.71
–5.37***
–0.49
R2
F
0.570
17.78
0.47
16.93
0.534
21.26
0.61
13.70
0.668
16.60
0.624
23.14
0.566
17.59
0.452
10.57
0.668
15.70
Comment. Dependent variable — Rate. Estimation using Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
standard errors. Number of observations omitted is in parentheses.
Values of the EST(ShImp21) variable used to test different variants of the Endogenous Protection
model are predicted from the respective variants of the Import Penetration model (Table 5).
In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second figure
stands for the value of the t-statistic, the third figure stands for the value of the beta coeffi-
cient.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** - significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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Table A7. Sensitivity of the Endogenous Protection Model to the Exclusion of In-
dependent Variables.
Variable excluded:
B
a
si
c
sp
e
c
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
E
S
T
(S
h
Im
p
2
1
)
∆ O
u
t
N
E
n
t
S
h
4
A
vS
a
le
s
S
h
Im
p
I 1
S
h
E
m
p
L
o
ss
D
In
t
Y-intercept –3.56
–1.02
3.00
0.82
–3.34
–0.98
–5.36
–1.46
0.60
0.16
–3.90
–0.12
–2.22
–0.65
–1.75
–0.55
–0.33
–0.13
–4.94
–1.41
EST
(ShImp21)
0.44
5.75***
0.51
0.45
6.15***
0.52
0.44
5.23***
0.51
0.43
5.15***
0.51
0.45
5.83***
0.52
0.45
5.83***
0.52
0.43
5.88***
0.50
0.46
6.17***
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3.61***
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Sh4 0.081
2.36**
0.19
0.07
1.54
0.16
0.08
2.38**
0.18
0.07
2.14**
0.17
0.08
2.45**
0.19
0.09
2.60**
0.21
0.07
1.93*
0.16
0.07
2.15**
0.17
0.08
2.24**
0.18
AvSales –5.34e–7
–1.93*
–0.08
–6.66e–7
–4.21***
–0.10
–5.24e–7
–1.92*
–0.08
–5.37e–7
–1.96*
–0.08
–5.97e–7
–2.02**
–0.09
–4.99e–7
–1.86*
–0.07
–5.87e–7
–1.98**
–0.08
–5.72e–7
–1.97**
–0.08
–6.03e–7
–2.16**
–0.09
ShImpI1 3.47
2.54**
0.17
3.93
2.04**
0.19
3.45
2.55**
0.17
3.86
2.81***
0.18
3.91
2.84***
0.19
3.42
2.49**
0.16
3.47
2.54*
0.17
3.32
2.43**
0.16
4.14
3.30***
0.20
ShEmp 0.31
1.16
0.08
–0.03
–0.08
–0.01
0.31
1.17
0.08
0.35
1.21
0.09
0.10
0.34
0.03
0.34
1.28
0.09
0.31
1.14
0.08
0.29
1.10
0.07
0.40
1.47
0.10
Loss 0.078
1.30
0.10
0.17
2.40**
0.22
0.08
1.25
0.10
0.14
2.63***
0.19
0.05
0.78
0.06
0.08
1.37
0.11
0.07
1.08
0.09
0.07
1.20
0.10
0.06
1.02
0.07
DInt –2.13
–1.53
–0.14
–4.76
–3.07***
–0.31
–2.09
–1.51
–0.13
–3.18
–2.48**
–0.20
–1.99
–1.42
–0.13
–2.26
–1.64
–0.15
–2.92
–2.18**
–1.19
–2.39
–1.72*
–0.15
–1.79
–1.35
–0.11
R2
F
0.570
17.78
0.378
16.75
0.570
19.79
0.545
12.84
0.544
15.87
0.565
20.04
0.55
21.20
0.565
19.07
0.563
19.00
0.558
19.25
Comment. In the table cells, the first figure stands for the regression coefficient, the second
figure stands for the value of the t-statistic, the third figure stands for the value of the beta
coefficient.
* — significant at the 10 per cent confidence level; ** — significant at the 5 per cent confi-
dence level; *** — significant at the 1 per cent confidence level.
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